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Abstract 
News organizations in many Western democracies face decreasing trust amid fake news accu-
sations. In this situation, news organizations risk losing their license to operate and need to 
defend their legitimacy. This study analyzes how The New York Times discredits fake news 
accusations, which are prominently expressed by US President Trump. A critical discourse 
analysis of The New York Times’ news articles about fake news accusations in the first 70 days 
following President Trump’s inauguration reveals four delegitimizing strategies used. First, the 
accusations are taken as a “badge of honor” for professional journalism but are morally evalu-
ated to damage journalism’s role as the fourth estate in democracy. Second, using sarcasm, the 
articles criticize President Trump’s capacity to govern and thus question his legitimacy. Third, 
reporting implies that fake news accusations aim at suppressing critical thinking as in authori-
tarian regimes. Fourth, accusations are described as irrational response to professional report-
ing or proven to be factually wrong, when possible. Overall, reporting in The Times portrays 
President Trump as an irresponsible leader risking the well-being of the country’s citizens, its 
journalism, and its democracy, as well as journalism in foreign countries.  
 
Keywords: critical discourse analysis; journalism; legacy media; legitimacy; news content; 
Trump; politics; populism 
 
 
Introduction 
News organizations fulfill important functions for democratic societies as they follow 
the ideal of a fourth estate. The basis for an efficient relationship between news media and 
democratic societies are attributions of legitimacy by the public toward the news media. How-
ever, legacy news media organizations have “lost the unquestioned, unchallenged status of a 
‘fact of nature’” in the digital social-networked age and have to “be more actively defended 
and reaffirmed” (Couldry 2009, 447).  
Legacy news organizations have been facing decreasing public trust and credibility in 
many Western democracies (Newman et al. 2016). In Germany, supporters of a right-wing 
opposition movement accuse mainstream legacy news organizations of generally being a 
Lügenpresse, or “lying press” (Hagen 2015). This term was used in Nazi Germany and has 
become a “flat-rate defamation” (Denner and Peter 2017, 3) against news outlets that are per-
ceived to follow the political elite and to report without a strong right- or left-leaning political 
stance in Germany (Newman et al. 2017). Likewise, the Finnish public holds the perception 
that news media follow the political elite in reporting (Hujanen 2007). In the US, a which has 
a news media system with a high degree of political parallelism (Newman et al. 2017), readers 
criticize The New York Times (NYT), an “archetype of the modern Western metropolitan news-
paper” (Tracy 2004, 451), for “not being objective, for creating false balance, for failing to 
uphold the standards of accuracy and truth, and for not being transparent” (Craft, Vos, and 
Wolfgang 2016, 687).  
Also, President Donald Trump has frequently criticized mainstream news organizations 
on Twitter, stating their reporting was biased, dishonest or fake. He supports instead right-
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leaning media such as Fox News (see Newman et al. 2017, 20 for a spectrum of the political 
polarization of news outlets in the US). A popular addressee of President Trump’s tweets 
(@realDonaldTrump) has been NYT (@nytimes), e.g., 
 
 The failing @nytimes has disgraced the media world. Gotten me wrong for two 
solid years. Change libel laws? (March 30, 2017) 
 The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, 
@CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People! (February 17, 
2017) 
 The fake news media is going crazy with their conspiracy theories and blind ha-
tred. @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable. @foxandfriends is great! (February 
15, 2017) 
 
These antagonistic tweets are a systematic approach to delegitimize the news as an in-
stitution. This intention is brought to an alarming level through the recent launch of Trump TV, 
which President Trump calls “real news” (Illing, August 09, 2017). President Trump’s fake 
news accusations can be regarded as a means to retain direct interpretive authority about his 
political legitimacy. His tweets attack the conduct and the product of news media. Since news 
content is the major source for news outlets’ performance and legitimacy assessments by soci-
ety (Bachmann and Ingenhoff 2017), such attacks could damage the addressed news outlets’ 
legitimacy. At the same time, news content is an efficient vehicle for strategic management of 
the legitimacy of a news outlet and thus can be used to defend legitimacy.  
Therefore, this study asks, How does The New York Times engage with fake news ac-
cusations against its news content? The goal is to reveal whether and, if so, how the news outlet 
delegitimizes fake news accusations using its editorial content to defend its legitimacy. The 
purpose of this article is to discuss ways of legitimacy management for news organizations to 
defend themselves from such accusations. As President Trumps’ libel laws tweet of March 30, 
2017, implies, news organizations could become vulnerable to legally rearranging their role in 
society. Concerning President Trump’s expressions, Edmondson (2017, 98) argues that “words 
are one thing, but the legal actions of a vengeful government official against the press are en-
tirely different.” On that matter, Waisbord and Amado (2017) demonstrate that Latin American 
presidential tweets harassing the press correlate with hostility toward freedom of expression 
and the right to communication. To impede the possibility of governmental restrictions on such 
subjects, it is critical for news outlets to defend their legitimacy. Claims by political conserva-
tives that liberal media show bias have led to the rise of a belief that there is a liberal ideological 
slant in news content (Domke et al. 1999), thus making legitimacy management even more 
relevant.  
The research question raised by this study is empirically answered following a critical 
discourse analysis approach applying van Leeuwen’s (2007) framework of delegitimizing strat-
egies on NYT’s news content that addresses fake news accusations during the first 70 days of 
Donald Trump’s presidency.  
 
Literature Review 
I conceptualize President Trump’s accusations as the discursive strategy of an institutionalized 
and politically conservative actor that are embedded in the context of expectations regarding 
the performance of news media (particularly to report truthfully and impartially), the news 
media’s conduct within their institutional field, and a “tradition” of liberal bias claims against 
news media. Following Fairclough and Wodak’s (1997) description of discursive practices as 
producing unequal power relations, President Trump’s accusations aim at altering power rela-
tions within the institutional field of the news media and between the news media and society.  
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Institutional Foundation of News Organizations’ Legitimacy  
Following the ideal of the fourth estate, news media are seen as social institutions, which are 
extremely visible in society (Fairclough 1995) and exhibit symbolic and persuasive power 
(Gitlin 1980). With power comes responsibility, or, according to an institutional view, social 
expectations that must be met by an organization to gain social legitimacy. Organizations are 
regarded to result from social expectations (Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowan 1977). News me-
dia organizations established because the role of fourth estate became necessary in the context 
of an evolving public sphere, social movements seeking for freedom of suppressed social 
groups, and the ideology of egalitarianism (Burrowes 2011).  
Organizational legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574). Tight coupling, i.e., 
conduct according to societal expectations, is a predisposition for legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Legitimacy provides an organization with ‘a reservoir of support’ (Tost 2011, 
686) that is vital for its survival (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).  
Regarding its powerful position within society, journalism has developed consensual 
rules and standards (McQuail 1992; Hanitzsch et al. 2011) to ensure that news media’s power 
is not misused, and thus providing journalism with a reservoir of social support. The Society 
of Professional Journalists (2014) sees its goals as to “Seek Truth and Report It.” “Act Inde-
pendently.” and “Be Accountable and Transparent.” NYT mentions principles of fairness and 
impartiality, integrity, and truth in its standards and ethics section.  
 
At a time of growing and even justified public suspicion about the impartiality, accuracy 
and integrity […] it is imperative that The Times and its staff maintain the highest pos-
sible standards to insure that we do nothing that might erode readers’ faith and confi-
dence in our news columns. (The New York Times 2017a) 
 
This suggests a tight coupling of NYT’s conduct to professional standards of the trade.  
The appropriateness of rules and standards is constantly being contested within the field 
of journalism (Hanitzsch and Vos 2017; Maushart 1986) and journalists discursively construct 
the societal responsibility of their work (Siltaoja 2009). Historically, the liberal press had 
gained political independency by being profitable and thus could gain legitimacy through the 
role of the fourth estate (Schultz 1998). Still, this role has been reinterpreted and transformed 
by news media since the nineteenth century (Schultz 1998). This discursive construction of 
appropriate standards is an attempt to manage the journalistic field, which Hardy and Phillips 
(1999) describe as discursive struggle. NYT standards and ethics reveal that the organization 
struggles with social expectations. Appealing for the “highest possible standards” suggests that 
NYT attempts to more tightly couple its standards to social expectations.  
To signal professional principles has allowed journalism to pursue the role of the fourth 
estate. Whether the role of the fourth estate is legitimate has been reason for debate.  
 
Challenging News Organizations’ Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is challenged when an organization’s behavior conflicts with societal norms and 
expectations. That is, the conduct of an organization decouples from societal expectations. If 
organizations do not act according to publicly demanded rules or standards, organizational le-
gitimacy is at risk.  
Because the fulfilment of expectations are a matter of opinion, it is easy to question the 
legitimacy of news media organizations. Schultz (1998, 100) notes that “the partisan nature of 
the news media has been a constant frustration for politicians.” The (perceived) news media’s 
political stance can risk its legitimacy. Objectivity has been described as the core principle of 
American journalism (Muñoz-Torres 2012; Schudson 2001). Since human perception is sub-
jective by nature and objectivity an impossible ideal (Muñoz-Torres 2012), accusations that 
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news reporting is politically biased can easily be articulated. The “liberal media bias” has been 
an increasingly popular claim of conservative political elites in the US for decades (Domke et 
al. 1999; Ladd 2012). Liberal media allegations may be part of a strategy to diminish public 
confidence in a non-conservative government and the press (Domke et al. 1999). In the politi-
cally polarized climate of the politically parallelized media system of the US, news organiza-
tions are confronted with competing expectations of two audience groups with opposing polit-
ical positions, i.e., the Democrats (who predominantly use liberal news sources) and the Re-
publicans (who prefer to use conservative news sources) (Newman et al. 2017; Iyengar and 
Hahn 2009).  
In the case of the Republican presidency in the US, liberal news outlets report about a 
political agenda that is often in conflict to their stance. When “faced with competing orders, 
models, or logics, organizations must find a way to hybridize them” (Lowrey and Erzikova 
2014, 558). A different use of article genres may hybridize these competing expectations. 
Whereas professional standards of factual reporting may be more important for straight news 
articles, the editorial political stance on a certain issue may be more relevant in editorial opinion 
pieces. Castilla, Rodríguez, and Quesada (2014, 71) suppose that the “editorial section is the 
perfect space to investigate the identity of newspapers.” However, a single news outlet with a 
non-conservative political stance cannot fully fulfill the expectations of both parties and its 
legitimacy may erode in the opposing group’s point of view. This societal group—especially 
conservative Republicans—might consider the reporting of news outlets as biased toward lib-
eral political views (Lee 2005). President Trump’s fake news accusations take up political par-
allelized stances within the US media system and turn it against the news media on the non-
conservative side of the political spectrum.  
At the same time, politicians “need a legitimated journalism that is perceived to [be 
authorized to] sanctify and render credible these institutions’ messages” (Lowrey 2011, 67). 
When political actors take up fake news accusations, they seek to damage news outlets’ sover-
eignty of interpretation and legitimacy and attempt to gain interpretative power for themselves. 
Because politicians still need to be legitimized through news outlets’ reporting, political actors 
require the support from news outlets reporting in line with politicians’ own political positions. 
Thus, delegitimizing accusations cannot address the entire field of journalism. Hence, in a 
highly politically parallelized media system such as the US, delegitimizing complaints can be 
expressed against the media holding a conflicting political stance.  
Using Twitter as a publishing platform enables politicians to attack critical journalists 
or citizens, which Waisbord and Amado (2017) show for the presidential Twitter use in Latin 
America. Waisbord and Amado (2017, 1330) conclude that “Twitter has been a megaphone for 
presidential attacks on the press and citizens. It has provided with a ready-made, always avail-
able platforms to lash out at critics, conduct personal battles, and get media attention.” Espe-
cially populist presidents were more likely that non-populist presidents to use Twitter to criti-
cize the press and make references to news. For example, Correa, the former president of Ec-
uador, tweeted, “@Guardian, show a little bit of professional integrity. Do some research, or 
at least pick up the phone.” (Waisbord and Amado 2017, 1339), which suggests a decoupling 
of the news outlets from professional standards. This tweet is similar in tone and content to 
President Trump’s tweets attacking news outlets. President Trump is criticized for applying 
“politics of debasement” (Ott 2016, 59) on Twitter and his tweets are described as “simple, 
impulsive, and uncivil” (Ott 2016, 64), suggesting his tweets have a lot in common with those 
of Latin American populistic presidents.  
 
Defending one’s Legitimacy as a News Organization 
From an institutional point of view, news organizations need to defend themselves against le-
gitimacy attacks to retain their right to exist. When exhibiting social accountability, not to react 
“can be understood as an illegitimate evasion and a transgression of norms” (Ekström 2009, 
681). Since news content is the basis for the social legitimacy attributions of the audience 
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(Bachmann and Ingenhoff 2017), news outlets provide themselves a platform for legitimacy 
defense. They can implement verbal legitimation strategies into their news content.  
However, the news media may not defend their legitimacy sufficiently. In the German 
Lügenpresse discourse, Denner and Peter (2017, 275) determine that the news media trivialize 
that fake news term used by populistic movements: “It sometimes even seems that newspapers 
use the term ironically as a synonym for themselves.” The authors conclude that the news me-
dia did not take the chance to discuss the term properly or even invalidate it. Instead German 
media may be establishing the use of Lügenpresse as synonym for mainstream news media. 
Therefore, news media missed an opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy and that of jour-
nalism itself. Jutel (2016) draws a similar conclusion from NYT’s reporting on the populistic 
Tea Party: journalism has failed to defend its universal value against populism. Although NYT 
treats the Tea Party as an “irrational pseudo-political actor” (Jutel 2016, 1129), NYT’s reporting 
remains rather moderate. 
 
The Times continues to function as the standard bearer, or last bastion, of the high mod-
ern paradigm of journalism. In writing for a liberal unified public, it attempts to strike 
a measured tone, imagining itself above the fray even while competitors in the field 
engage in a political battle to undermine all that the Times stands for. (Jutel 2016, 1134) 
 
Thus, the self-concept of a legacy news outlet within the journalistic field may prevent 
a strong delegitimization of fake news accusations. Moreover, replying to fake news accusa-
tions would signal that a news outlet accepts President Trump’s conditions of the discourse. 
NYT could assume that their audience predominantly shares their political stance (Iyengar and 
Hahn 2009), which might make an extensive delegitimizing of fake news accusations redun-
dant. This could also be a reason why German news outlets did not defend themselves but 
ironically used the term “fake news.” The extent of explicit opinions and delegitimizing in 
news articles may even be perceived improperly by the audience, since this is what opinion 
pieces are used for. Jutel (2016, 1135) notes that in straight news or feature reporting “the 
Times claims to be objectively representing the social world, as opposed to opinion pieces that 
are intended to ‘push the envelope,’ framing the range of acceptable opinions.”  
A further argument that may prevent an accused news outlet from delegitimizing fake 
news accusations is that the accusations may even help the news outlet to increase its audience, 
as positive first-quarter results in 2017 of the NYT and CNN may suggest (Bond, May 03, 2017). 
Thus, in contrast to previous research revealing that “liberal media” accusations harm the in-
stitutional legitimacy of news media (Ladd 2012; Domke et al. 1999), the current fake news 
accusations in an increasingly polarized political environment may even help liberal news me-
dia.  
Against this background, this study asks, How does The New York Times engage with 
fake news accusations against its news content? 
 
Method 
Critical Discourse Analysis Approach 
Public discourses occur within wider processes of social and cultural change, power relations, 
and ideological societal processes (Fairclough 1995). Fairclough and Wodak (1997) note that 
discourse is social practice. That is, discourse constitutes situations, institutions, and social 
structures. In addition, discourse is socially conditioned, as it helps to sustain or change the 
social status quo. Different actors and content compete for interpretative dominance of a public 
discourse. Critical discourse analysis presumes power relations between actors expressing 
views within a discourse using “strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own in-
terests” (van Dijk 1993, 254, italics in original). Critical discourse analysis attempts to reveal 
such power relations and “root out a particular kind of delusion” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 
187) within a discourse.  
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The discourse considered in this study was initiated by Donald Trump’s fake news ac-
cusations against US liberal news media—a discourse with a long past of liberal bias accusa-
tions (Domke et al. 1999; Ladd 2012). The present analysis focuses on NYT as one example of 
the accused subjects to study that subject’s reaction to the accusations. NYT was chosen as a 
well-known representative of the liberal news media that has institutionalized the field of jour-
nalism since the nineteenth century (Schultz 1998; Maushart 1986). Additionally, NYT is a 
popular addressee of liberal media bias claims (Domke et al. 1999). The material for analysis 
is the editorial products of NYT, which are socially and discursively constructed. This analysis 
focuses on a temporal fragment of the discourse, namely, the first 70 days after Donald Trump 
had been turned into a political institution as the US President. During this period, President 
Trump tweeted 16 times directly addressing NYT (see Figure 1). The critical analysis aims at 
assessing whether NYT can retain its legitimacy and achieve interpretative dominance in this 
discourse. 
 
Sample and Coding 
First, a sample of n = 182 articles was drawn from LexisNexis. This included all articles pub-
lished by NYT between January 20 and March 30, 2017 (the first 70 days of President Trump’s 
presidency following his inauguration) with the term “fake news” anywhere in the text. During 
this period, NYT’s reporting referred to “fake news” more than 400 times, that is, about six 
times per day. From this sample, those articles referring not to fake news accusations were 
excluded. These were articles that referred to fake news only as “either wholly false or con-
taining deliberately misleading elements incorporated within its content or context” in line with 
Bakir and McStay’s (2017, 1) fake news definition. For example, NYT refers to fake news as 
“stories invented from whole cloth, designed to attract social shares and web traffic by flatter-
ing the prejudices of their intended audience” and note that “a large number of Americans have 
become accustomed to rejecting factual information, or even that they have become habituated 
to believing hoaxes.” Slightly more than half of the sampled articles (n = 99, 54%) relate to 
this “real” fake news issue. The final sample with articles referring to fake news as formulated 
in President Trump’s accusations comprises n = 83 articles.  
The bases for coding were the section or sections within each article in which the term 
“fake news” appears. The delegitimizing strategies used in this section were coded. If the “fake 
news” section did not include a delegitimizing argument, the following and previous sections 
within an article were included to the coding. Thus, coding measures the variety of delegiti-
mizing strategies used in NYT articles about fake news accusations. 
 
Analytic Framework 
Building on the multimodal legitimation strategies of van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), van 
Leeuwen (2007), and van Dijk (2006), five major verbal legitimation strategies can be distin-
guished. van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and van Leeuwen (2007) separate four sub-catego-
ries of justifying strategies, namely, authorization through personal or impersonal institution-
alized authorities, rationalization through purposes, moral evaluation that links activities to 
values such as leadership and governmental control, and mythopoesis through telling stories. 
Authorization answers the question “Why must it be so?” using a “Because so-and-so says so” 
answer (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 104). Thus, as a delegitimizing strategy of an accusa-
tion, it answers “Why is it not so?” Rationalization refers to the utility of the social practice, 
for example, referring to common sense or academic studies, or uses definitions and explana-
tions. Moral evaluations comprise any references to values that moralize an activity, such as 
public interests or economic value. Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999, 108) describe it as the 
“one of the least explicit forms of legitimation.” Mythopoesis is telling a story, often negative, 
that is taken as evidence for a behavior, which then legitimizes an activity regulating such 
behavior. In addition, van Dijk (2006, 380) describes various forms of positive self-presenta-
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tion and negative other-presentation through “enhancing the power, moral superiority and cred-
ibility of the speaker(s), and discrediting dissidents, while vilifying the Others, the enemy; the 
use of emotional appeals; and adducing seemingly irrefutable proofs of one’s beliefs and rea-
sons.” Such negative other-representations were often telling a sarcastic narrative about Donald 
Trump in the present sample. Therefore, negative other-representation and mythopoesis were 
summarized to “sarcastic and mythopoetic other-representation” for analysis.   
Intracoder reliability achieved at least 86% of agreement for the resulting categories: 
(1) authorization, (2) rationalization, (3) moral evaluation, and (4) sarcastic and mythopoetic 
other-representation. 
The article genre is derived from the type of desk and the section it is published in. This 
information is part of the article metadata in LexisNexis. For example, ‘Editorial Desk; op-ed 
columnist’ indicates an opinion piece, whereas articles in the ‘Foreign Desk’ or ‘National Desk’ 
are coded as straight news. 
 
Results 
Straight Versus Opinionated News Articles 
Overall, nearly a third of the articles (29%, n = 24) on fake news accusations is an opinion 
piece (71%, n = 59 straight news articles). On average, about one straight news article is pub-
lished every day and one opinionated news article every three days during the observation pe-
riod. In straight news, delegitimizing strategies are used 86 times (on average 1.5 delegitimiz-
ing arguments per article), of which 19% are authorization, 10% rationalization, 50% morali-
zation, and 21% sarcastic and mythopoetic other-representation. In opinionated news, delegit-
imizing strategies are used 24 times (on average 1 delegitimizing argument per article), of 
which 4% are authorization, 4% rationalization, 58% moralization, and 33% sarcastic and 
mythopoetic other-representation. Straight news articles use authorities and rational arguments 
to delegitimize fake news accusations more often than opinionated news do. Opinionated news 
use moral or sarcastic arguments slightly more frequent than straight news articles. Moral ar-
guments are the key delegitimizing strategies in both article genres.  
Hence, NYT may partly use article genres to hybridize competing expectations of audi-
ences since there is a difference in dispassion across the two article genres. However, since 
straight news did not refrain entirely from using sarcasm or mythopoesis, one could accuse it 
of lacking objectivity or even as decoupling from professional standards. 
 
Delegitimizing Fake News Accusations 
In the articles about fake news accusations (n = 83), the legitimation strategy of moral evalua-
tion is used most often (n = 57), followed by sarcastic or mythopoetic other-representation (n 
= 26), authorization (n = 17), and rationalization (n = 10). Figure 2 plots the variety of delegit-
imizing strategies used over the observation period. In the first 20 days of the observation pe-
riod, the articles use moral evaluation, rationalization, and sarcastic, negative other-represen-
tation or mythopoesis. Authorization is added as a delegitimizing strategy when tweets by Pres-
ident Trump and reporting about fake news accusations intensify in February. In March, the 
number of articles decreases to the level of January again, making use of four delimitation 
strategies.  
 
Moral Evaluation 
NYT extensively morally delegitimizes President Trump’s fake news accusations through val-
ues of professional journalism and its role in democracy as the fourth estate. The conduct of 
domestic and foreign news outlets, the relation to the audience, and democracy in general are 
described to be put at risk.  
Fake news accusations are described to harm journalism in four stages. First, they ob-
struct the professional conduct of White House reporters, “The press must battle every day to 
wrest the truth from the tangled web of West Wing deceit, delusion and charges of ‘fake news 
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blah blah blah.’” Second, the accusations follow actions against the accused news outlets, “‘We 
strongly protest the exclusion of The New York Times and the other news organizations. Free 
media access to a transparent government is obviously of crucial national interest.’” Third, the 
accusations have consequences for the conduct of news outlets. They lead to self-censorship, 
as reported by the editor of a particular news outlet: “[The editor of The Journal] said that 
Americans already distrusted the news media, and that if The Journal covered Mr. Trump in an 
overly confrontational way, that distrust might increase.” Thus, that news outlet gives in to the 
strategic goal of the biased news media claim of conservative political elites. This suggests a 
looser coupling to the professional standard of independence and not performing as govern-
ment lapdog. It also refers to the discursive nature of professional standards that are subject to 
social negotiation within the journalistic field. Therefore, professional standards might become 
susceptible to frequently expressed fake news accusations for selective news outlets at least.  
Fourth, fake news accusations harm journalism in foreign countries, too, since “Auto-
crats see a green light” now. In Russia, fake news accusations are adopted and extended: “the 
Foreign Ministry has […] a new feature on its website in which articles critical of the govern-
ment are stamped with a big red ‘FAKE.’” In Turkey, “President Recep Tayyip Erdogan com-
mended Mr. Trump for putting a CNN reporter ‘in his place’ […] and said such organizations 
‘undermine national unity.’” Reporting stresses that Tukey is a country with low press freedom 
“where scores of journalists have been arrested and more than 150 media companies closed 
down.” When governmental actors of countries with a low level of press freedom support or 
even imitate President Trump’s behavior, this strongly indicates that press freedom is at stake 
in the US. 
In addition to directly affecting news outlets, the narrative of a liberal bias has settled 
into the public’s beliefs about journalism and becomes manifest in decreasing trust in main-
stream media. NYT states that fake news accusations are “Mr. Trump’s tactic of pitting the 
press against the public,” disclosing the strategic goal behind the accusations. One journalist 
reports that “I’ll get messages from people that are just: ‘No, that’s completely wrong. Every-
thing you said is fake. The New York Times is fake. It’s all fake. You’re an idiot. I hate you.’” 
More generally, President Trump’s behavior in his institutionalized role has negative social 
consequences, “The president is a reference point; if he lies, lying seeps deep into the culture.” 
So not just attacking and debasing news organizations but lying has become part of the political 
and social culture.  
Thus, NYT reporting warns about negative consequences for the conduct and product 
of domestic as well as foreign news outlets as well as society. In sum, NYT morally suggests 
that fake news accusations harm journalisms’ role as the fourth estate and damage people’s 
trust in news, which eventually harms democracy. 
 
Sarcastic and Mythopoetic Other-Representation 
Negative or sarcastic narratives aim at degrading President Trump’s legitimacy rather than del-
egitimizing fake news accusations themselves. From time to time the reporting of NYT makes 
fun of President Trump and his accusations using sarcasm, sometimes by quoting external 
sources or even sympathizers of President Trump. By selecting statements by credible external 
sources, the author of an article avoids using her or his own words and adds authority that 
emphasizes the article’s slant. When citing sympathizers of Trump who describe unpresidential 
characteristics, these descriptions gain additional credibility.  
Various references question President’s Trump’s ability to govern. Indicating that Pres-
ident Trump’s statements are neither trustworthy nor reasonable, the NYT reports that “The 
dictionary’s tweet overlaid his words with a definition for paralogize (‘to draw conclusions that 
do not follow logically from a given set of assumptions’), which was Dictionary.com’s word 
of the day.” Further, an opinion article cynically compares President Trump to previous presi-
dencies.  
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The old bar: Inspire viewers with oratorical flair. The new bar: Prove capable of speak-
ing for 60 minutes without throwing a temper tantrum and ranting about ratings, the 
failing New York Times, fake news or the size of your inaugural crowd. Bonus points: 
Refrain, for eight days, from tweeting in ALL CAPS. 
 
Another opinion article ironically imitates his tweeting style, “Yes, Mr. President, everyone is 
saying you are right! And they’re saying, wow, you made a BIG discovery about NATO spend-
ing!”, followed by the directly offending sentence, “They are also saying there’s an unidenti-
fied lying object in the White House.”  
The reporting also refers in more detailed fashion to some of President Trump’s ama-
teurish and naive characteristics. A national desk article reports that “aides to Mr. Trump say 
he fares best when he’s able to target -- and nickname -- an opponent, whether it is ‘Little 
Marco’ Rubio, ‘Crooked Hillary’ Clinton or the ‘Fake News’ media,” implying narrow-mind-
edness to some extent. However, dismissing fake news accusations as nicknames trivializes the 
potential legitimacy danger that is related to this term. In addition, references to President 
Trump’s modest vocabulary are made, for example, “Still, for a sophisticated consumer of 
news, Mr. Trump retains a brutally simple, almost Manichaean view of his coverage: good 
stories are good, bad stories are evil.” Another person close to President Trump is cited as 
inferring narcissistic desires, “‘He loves the press; he lives for it,’ Howard Stern, a frequent 
Trump interviewer and friend, said […]. ‘He wants to be liked; he wants to be loved.’ Being 
president […] is not ‘going to be a healthy experience.’” Consequently, reporting suggests that 
President Trump’s fake news accusations can be attributed to his personality instead of being 
an actual liberal media bias.  
Overall, these negative and sarcastic remarks portray President Trump as being incapa-
ble of being a credible president.  
 
Authorization 
NYT uses individual institutionalized and collective authorities from academia, journalism, pol-
itics, and the public, as well as partisans of autocratic regimes to delegitimize President 
Trump’s fake news accusations and to legitimize the performance and importance of the news 
media as the fourth estate.  
Many of the quoted authorities react to President Trump’s tweet about the media being 
an enemy of the American people (February 17, 2017). A very authoritative source is the for-
mer Republican President George W. Bush who disapproves of President Trump’s accusations. 
 
‘I consider the media to be indispensable to democracy,’ Mr. Bush told Matt Lauer, the 
‘Today’ host. ‘We need the media to hold people like me to account. I mean, power can 
be very addictive and it can be corrosive and it’s important for the media to call to 
account people who abuse their power, whether it be here or elsewhere.’ 
 
Since Bush had the same institutionalized role within the same party as President Trump, his 
statement enhances the legitimacy of the news media and more strongly degrades that of Pres-
ident Trump than any other political authority could. In addition, a reference to the American 
society is made, “But in interviews around the country this week, Americans of varying polit-
ical affiliations, even those with serious misgivings about the media, largely allowed that the 
president’s characterization had gone too far,” complementing the picture of inadequacy of 
President Trump’s accusations. Quoting the lionized journalist Carl Bernstein whose practice 
has notably fulfilled societal expectations to journalism as the fourth estate enhances journal-
ism’s legitimacy. 
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‘Oh boy,’ Carl Bernstein, the journalist who helped to uncover the Watergate scandal, 
said on Friday, after a reporter read him Mr. Trump’s tweet. ‘Donald Trump is demon-
strating an authoritarian attitude and inclination that shows no understanding of the role 
of the free press.’ 
 
NYT also quotes a “left-leaning” former Obama State Department official as saying, “Author-
itarian governments sow distrust and division as a way of discrediting anything that is negative 
or critical of them.” To underline the authoritarian attitude reporting implicitly compares the 
situation of the US media to that of the Russian media, indicating that fake news accusations 
are an oppressive strategy.  
 
The Russian dissident and chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov drew upon long famili-
arity with that process when he tweeted: ‘The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to 
misinform or push an agenda. It is to ex-haust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth.’ 
 
NYT quotes a former Soviet Communist Party leader comparing President Trump’s wording to 
the dictator Stalin.  
 
‘The formula “enemy of the people […] was specifically introduced for the purpose of 
physically annihilating such individuals” who disagreed with the supreme leader [Stalin] 
[…] Mr. Trump has demonstrated, Ms. Khrushcheva said, that the language of ‘autoc-
racy, of state nationalism is always the same […] formulas of insult, humiliation, dom-
ination, branding, enemy-forming and name calling are always the same.’ 
 
That article also mentions that the White House did not comment about the origin of the “toxic 
phrase,” which shows the professional journalistic working procedures of NYT. 
In sum, various authorities delegitimize President Trump’s fake news accusations and 
reveal an underlying oppressive strategy of such accusations. The overall conclusion from 
NYT’s reporting is that the fake news accusations aim at installing authoritarian rule.  
 
Rationalization 
NYT regards fake news accusations as an irrational overreaction to professional journalistic 
reporting and “all-purpose insult” against liberal leaning news outlets. Reporting indicates that 
the accusations are inappropriate, for example by using quotation marks: “President Trump’s 
[…] tendency to deride any less-than-flattering report as ‘fake news.’” or, “In Trumpworld, 
numbers are what you want them to be, and anything else is fake news.” The term “Trumpworld” 
implies that President Trump follows a different set of rules that are irrational in the field of 
journalism. NYT as a journalistic institution implies that it follows its role as a member of the 
fourth estate. In contrast, a government lapdog would write flattering reports and would not get 
awarded with fake news accusations. A statement by president of CNN that “Our folks […] 
wear those insults as a badge of honor” encourages liberal news media to consider fake news 
accusations as acknowledgement of their work. 
 NYT can seldom factually refute the accusations since they are too generally formulated, 
which reporting criticizes: “It’s a dangerous and troubling situation for governments or indi-
viduals to simply assign the label of fake news to a story they don’t like, instead of challenging 
specific facts or offering counter-evidence.” Official sources or evidence can rarely be used, 
such as “Recent F.B.I. data indicates that crime rates have been dropping […] which Mr. Trump 
referred to as ‘totally out of control.’” or “But most of the polls Mr. Trump referred to actually 
reflected the popular vote total within the margin of error.” Alternatively, reporting adds a 
personal assessment, for example, “Sadly, potus is just wrong about the facts.” Very rarely, 
reporting directly refers to the general accusations. In one example, a reporter replies to 
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Trump’s enemy-of-the-people tweet, “Biased? Probably. Oppositional? Maybe. Essential? In 
theory. But the enemy? Not so much.” This implies that NYT is accepting that part of President 
Trump’s accusations is in accordance with their identity, but, overall, remains untroubled.  
Thus, reporting suggests that President Trump’s accusations are irrational and, when 
possible, factually wrong. 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
Conclusion 
This study investigates NYT’s verbal delegitimizing strategies in their editorial content 
against President Trump’s continuing fake news accusations. These fake news accusations re-
late to a long “tradition” of conservative politicians imputing a liberal media bias. The narrative 
of a liberal bias has settled into the public’s beliefs about journalism and becomes manifest in 
decreasing trust in mainstream media. Therefore, news media risk losing public legitimacy, 
which constitutes their license to operate. The utterance of press-antagonistic expressions is 
often a favorite act among populist presidents, which also corresponds to their hostility against 
freedom of expression (Waisbord and Amado 2017). Hence, it is most relevant for news media 
to defend their legitimacy.  
Using the four delegitimizing strategies moral evaluation, mythopoesis, authorization, 
and rationalization, NYT applies a complete set of verbal possibilities, according to van Leeu-
wen and Wodak (1999), to defend its legitimacy. The most frequently used delegitimating 
strategy morally evaluates the damage of fake news accusations to journalism’s role as the 
fourth estate domestically and abroad as well as to the trust of the audience (moral evaluation). 
Although moral evaluation is regarded as the least explicit delegitimizing strategy (van Leeu-
wen and Wodak 1999, 104), news media can well relate to moral values of public interest due 
to their institutionalized role as fourth estate. Through moral evaluation, news outlets can argue 
how concerned they are about democratic values and that they are tightly coupled to societal 
expectations, which is the basis for their legitimacy according to institutional theory (Ashforth 
and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Secondly, negative or sarcastic narratives chal-
lenge President Trump’s governmental capacity (mythopoesis). For such narratives, NYT could 
be criticized for not following objectivity standards, especially when sarcasm occurs in straight 
news articles instead of opinion pieces. But articles often refer to external sources that describe 
President Trump’s nature. This can be viewed as a strategy to hybridize competing objectives 
as described by Lowrey and Erzikova (2014). Third, by quoting institutionalized authorities 
from academia, journalism, politics, partisans of autocratic regimes, and the public, NYT’s re-
porting illustrates that fake news accusations are extreme and aim at suppressing critical think-
ing as in authoritarian regimes (authorization). Fourth and least frequently, reporting describes 
the accusations as an irrational overreaction to professional journalistic reporting, debunks 
them as tactic of inciting the public against the press, and, if possible, proves that they are 
factually wrong (rationalization). Unspecific liberal news bias accusations are not invalidated, 
for example through proving that reporting is unbiased, which was also determined in the Ger-
man “Lügenpresse” news discourse by Denner and Peter (2017) and criticized by Jutel (2016). 
Instead, discussing the effects of fake news accusations on journalism and society and ques-
tioning President Trump’s leadership attempts to discredit the accusations.  
In sum, NYT’s reporting illustrates the expression of fake news accusations as irrespon-
sible and risking the wellbeing of the country’s citizens, of journalism, and of democracy, as 
well as journalism in foreign countries. After all, the accusations may be worn as a “badge of 
honor” by journalists and no reason at all to change the paper’s reporting methods. However, 
other news outlets not being an “archetype” of journalism (Tracy 2004, 451) as NYT may give 
in to the demand to report more positively about President Trump.  
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To conclude, by revealing the strategic nature of fake news accusations, NYT is aware 
of the attack on their legitimacy. Yet, NYT seems mostly intent on defending the legitimacy of 
journalism but not explicitly its own legitimacy. NYT upholds journalism as a social institution 
emphasizing journalism’s responsibility for civic society as the fourth estate. NYT’s reporting 
also warns of negative effects of fake news accusations within the field of journalism, such as 
a deterioration of professional standards that are discursive in nature (Hanitzsch and Vos 2017; 
Maushart 1986), potential self-censorship of news outlets, and repression of news organiza-
tions in countries with an already low level of press freedom. Therefore, NYT attempts to man-
age the journalistic field (Hardy and Phillips 1999) and does not leave President Trump in 
possession of interpretative power.  
However, the “badge of honor” for one side may still be regarded as justified complaints 
by others in the politically fragmented public in the US. It is questionable whether NYT’s del-
egitimizing strategies are sufficient to satisfy expectations of politically conservative members 
of the audience—if these members get in touch with NYT’s reporting at all. Especially against 
the background of the launch of Trump TV, an online network financed by President Trump’s 
reelection fund (Illing, August 09, 2017), which is an attempt to institutionalize propaganda 
messages, it is most relevant that viewers of that content are made aware of what they are 
watching and how it is different from independent journalism. Since these viewers are not 
likely to be aware of liberal media news content, news organizations are not able to defend 
their legitimacy and journalistic professional standards by themselves. To find more general 
means to defend the “liberal” news media’s legitimacy we may have to reconsider how the 
news media were established in societies where egalitarianism became a core value (Burrowes 
2011). 
Analyzing the editorial content allowed this study to understand the stance and identity 
of NYT, as argued by Castilla, Rodríguez, and Quesada (2014). Nonetheless, this study has 
major limitations and suggestions for future research. One of those limitations is that this study 
leaves unclear whether President Trumps’ accusations damage or even enhance the legitimacy 
of accused news outlets. As NYT’s first-quarter results of 2017 reveal, the number of online 
subscriptions has increased (Bond, May 03, 2017), which could be a proxy for growing legiti-
macy—at least for one part of the audience in the politically polarized US. On the other hand, 
user comments on a NYT Facebook advertisement stating, “Facts. We seek them out. We check 
them. We help you make sense of them” (The New York Times 2017b), reveal a hostile attitude 
toward NYT (e.g., “facts... you make them up... you spin them... you lie about them. because 
you are proxies for the Democrats and you have no journalistic integrity or ethics...”). It also 
remains in question whether and which delegitimizing strategies being used are effective in 
convincing audience members about news media’s legitimacy. Coming studies could experi-
mentally test which legitimation strategy is effective in changing legitimacy ascriptions of 
news media by audience members of different political positions and reflecting society’s frag-
mented audiences. For democracy, it could be most healthy if research can identify which le-
gitimation strategies convince supporters of political populists or even propagators of conspir-
acy theories of a more nuanced worldview. In addition, journalism scholars could assess 
whether fake news accusations may lead to self-censorship with news outlets who might fear 
to displease audience members through critical writing. Finally, if future research could suggest 
a means to prevent potential “legal actions of a vengeful government official against the press” 
(Edmondson 2017, 98), it would be performing a great duty to society. 
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Figure 1: Article genre and number of tweets by President Trump per day  
Note. President Trump’s tweets according to trumptwitterarchive.com 
 
 
Figure 2: Variety of delegitimizing strategies per day  
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